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A Real-time Group Auction System for Efficient
Allocation of Cloud Internet Applications
Chonho Lee, Ping Wang, Dusit Niyato
Abstract
Increasing number of the cloud-based Internet applications demands for efficient resource and cost
management. This paper proposes a real-time group auction system for the cloud instance market. The
system is designed based on a combinatorial double auction, and its applicability and effectiveness are
evaluated in terms of resource efficiency and monetary benefits to auction participants (e.g., cloud users
and providers). The proposed auction system assists them to decide when and how providers allocate their
resources to which users. Furthermore, we propose a distributed algorithm using a group formation game
that determines which users and providers will trade resources by their cooperative decisions. To find how
to allocate the resources, the utility optimization problem is formulated as a binary integer programming
problem, and the nearly optimal solution is obtained by a heuristic algorithm with quadratic time complexity.
In comparison studies, the proposed real-time group auction system with cooperation outperforms an
individual auction in terms of the resource efficiency (e.g., the request acceptance rate for users and
resource utilization for providers) and monetary benefits (e.g., average payments for users and total profits
for providers).
Index Terms
Cloud Computing, Group Auction, Resource Provisioning, Resource Pricing
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is a large-scale distributed computing leveraging Internet-accessible data cen-
ters that provide computing resources (e.g., CPU, memory, storage, and network bandwidth)
as cloud. Modern Internet applications are designed using the virtualization technology in the
cloud computing environment. Such cloud-based Internet applications are deployed on virtual
machines (VMs), also called instances [1] whose resource requirements are pre-configured. Cloud
users (e.g., application developers) request a certain number of instances to run their applications,
which are hosted by cloud providers (e.g., owners of physical machines). According to the
number of instances that cloud users use, cloud providers charge the fee for what the cloud
users used.
This paper studies the issues of cost efficiency for cloud users and resource efficiency for cloud
providers. Users are required to minimize the cost to deploy and run their applications on clouds
and to maximize the reliability of the applications by improving the resource availability. On the
other hand, providers are required to maximize their revenue by attracting users and improving
C. Lee, P. Wang, and D. Niyato are with the School of Computer Engineering at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. Email:
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the resource utilization. However, it is hard for users to determine which providers that they
should trade with, and vice versa, to meet their objectives under dynamic and unpredictable
resource demands, supplies, prices, and budgets.
The goal of this paper is to design a real-time auction system for the cloud instance market
where multiple cloud users and providers respectively buy and sell instances to run and host
cloud-based Internet applications. The proposed auction system assists the auction participants
(i.e., both cloud users and providers) to decide how providers allocate their resources to which
users in order to improve both cost and resource efficiency.
To achieve the goal, we introduce a group auction and the participants’ cooperation. A group
auction is a type of auctions and a market method that benefits both buyers and sellers. Specif-
ically, sellers offer buyers price discounts according to the number of requested items (i.e., the
more the requested items, the lower the price). One example scenario of such auction is the online
group-buying shopping sites [2], [3], and [4], which have recently become popular. However,
the group auction has not been extensively analyzed in cloud computing although it has been
well studied in economics. One of the objectives of this paper is to investigate the applicability
and effectiveness of a group auction to the cloud instance market.
In the proposed group auction, multiple cloud users are allowed to form a group, called a
user coalition in order to buy their instances at a discounted price. Multiple cloud providers are
also allowed to form a group, called a provider coalition and share their resources to effectively
use the residual resources, which results in the improvement of resource utilization.
In such a cooperative system, users expect to buy instances at a low price, and the providers
expect to attract more users to improve the resource utilization and thus to increase their
revenues. However, the cooperation may cause a delay of the instance allocation (e.g., by waiting
for more users to join an auction) and a cost for the instance migration [5] (e.g., a cost incurred
by the performance degradation of applications when instances are migrated to different servers
in different providers). There is a need for the analysis of participants’ cooperation decisions, i.e.,
when to or not to cooperate. It is challenging to find stable set of such decisions, which satisfies
all of rational participants trying to maximize only their own benefits. The contributions of this
paper can be summarized as follows:
• We propose a real-time group auction system in the cloud instance market, which is designed
based on a combinatorial double auction, and verify its applicability and effectiveness in
terms of resource efficiency and benefits to auction participants.
• We propose a distributed algorithm using a group formation game that determines which
users and providers will trade resources by their cooperative decisions.
• The utility optimization problem is formulated as a binary integer programming problem for
the resource allocation, and the nearly optimal solution is obtained by a heuristic algorithm
with quadratic time complexity.
The proposed real-time group auction system gives auction participants the resource efficiency
(e.g., 13% higher request acceptance rate for users and 26% higher resource utilization for
providers) and monetary benefits (e.g., 7% lower average payments for users and 6% higher
total profits for providers) compared to a conventional individual auction with the best-fit
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allocation. The proposed group formation and instance allocation algorithms are analyzed in
their complexity, stability, and optimality. The results show that the algorithms with quadratic
time complexity always obtain a nearly optimal group structure regardless of configurations and
initial conditions. The proposed system acts as a glue that binds cloud users and providers, and
it can be used by providers or third parties (i.e., brokers) for efficient cloud service delivery and
resource management in the practical system.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
• Section 2 introduces existing related work and summarizes their similarities and differences
from our work.
• Section 3 explains how the cloud instance market works in a group auction manner, and
then overviews a system model for the proposed group auction. Some assumptions that we
considered in the system are stated in this section.
• Section 4 formulates the instance allocation as the social welfare optimization and presents
in detail how to achieve the nearly optimal solution by the proposed group formation
algorithm.
• Section 5 gives a theoretical analysis of the proposed group formation algorithm in terms
of the time complexity and stability.
• Section 6 discusses the convergence and optimality of the proposed algorithm on numerical
results and compare the results with different schemes through the simulation, which is
followed by a conclusion.
2 RELATED WORK
This section introduces existing related work and describes their similarities and differences from
our work, which are summarized in Table 1 in terms of resource allocation methods, auction
types, and cooperation methods.
Resource Allocation
The importance of resource provisioning has been well discussed in various fields such as
wireless networks, energy industries, and advertisements, which have proposed the allocation
and pricing model of resources (e.g., wireless channels [6], [7], electricity [8], [9], and adver-
tisements [10], [11]) to improve the resource utilization and efficiency. We focus on instances in
clouds and consider an instance market where computing resources (e.g., bandwidth, CPU time
and memory space) are traded as instances.
For the resource allocation, there exist several techniques such as game theory finding an equi-
librium solution among players [12], [13]; stochastic programming considering uncertainty [14];
and bio-inspired mechanisms (e.g., genetic algorithm that seeks a Pareto solution of a multi-
objective problem [15] and Ant colony that provides a heuristic solution of a complex prob-
lem [16]). We apply the auction theory to design the cloud instance market and formulate its
instance allocation.
Auction-based Mechanism
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TABLE 1: Summary of related work (A symbol ”-” indicates omission for out of the paper scope.)
Resources
Allocation methods Auction types Single-sided Double-sided
Auction-based Others Individual [24] [19, 20, 25]
Electricity [8, 9] - Group [2, 3, 4] Our work
Wireless spectrum [6, 17, 18] -
Cloud instances
Our work [12, 14, 15
Cooperation
Centralized Self-interested
[19, 20, 24, 25] 16, 21, 22] decision decision
Others [2, 3, 4] - Buyers [22] [21]
Buyers and/or Sellers - Our work
Auction-based mechanisms have been proposed in various fields such as wireless networks
and cloud computing in order to investigate how participants (or nodes) behave in a competition
for resources; and different classes of auctions such as sequential second price auction [17],
Vickrey auction [18], double auction [19], and combinatorial auction [20] have been considered
in the design of the mechanisms. However, none of them considers a group auction and the par-
ticipants’ cooperation. We investigate a combinatorial double auction executed in a group-buying
manner and analyze the optimal allocation by observing participants’ cooperative decisions in
a group (or coalition) formation game.
Cooperation
Cooperation is one of the important concepts to improve the resource efficiency. The dis-
tributed resource management schemes in computational grid were developed with negotiation
algorithm [21] and coalition formation algorithm [22]. These schemes allow rational agents
managing server farms to form the cooperation to share available resources. The cooperative task
scheduling has been proposed in [23]. It was shown that it is always possible to obtain collabo-
rative solution of the self-interested agents which can improve the global system performance.
We adopt the concept of cooperation among users and providers under the consideration of both
the cost and resource efficiency. None of the works considered a dynamic instance allocation in
a group auction from the coalitional game perspective.
Cloud Instance Market
The proposed work differs from the major cloud hosting services such as AmazonEC2’s Spot
Instance [24] and SpotCloud [25], which deal with the instance market. [24] tries to sell the
residual resources to cloud users to achieve high resource utilization. Users join an auction to
reserve instances and pay for the resources at a dynamically changing spot price offered based
on the supply-demand conditions. Our work is similar to this in terms of the trading price
changed based on supply-demand conditions. But, [24] is considered to be a one-sided auction
that users’ requests are individually processed in a first-come-first manner. Our work is a double
auction executed in a group auction manner.
Similar to the proposed system, [25] works as a double auction, and resource prices change
depending on providers’ valuations to the resources. Users submit their instance requirements,
and providers submit profiles of hardware to be supplied. [25] lists the profiles best-matched for
the user requirements, and the users will choose what they want from the list. For providers,
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[25] automatically creates instances on providers’ machines requested by users. Our proposed
approach can be applied to such SpotCould market to automate the users’ provider selection
step; it tries to find the best matching of users and providers cooperating each other to gain
benefits in terms of monetary cost and resource efficiency.
In the evaluation section, we verify the impact of group auction and cooperation by comparing
the proposed scheme with the two schemes. However, for the fair comparison, we extend them
as follows, and we respectively call IA-FCFS and GA-BCT (described in Table 4). IA-FCFS mimics
[24] but considering multiple providers, and we try to observe the impact of group auction. GA-
BCT mimics [25] but following our allocation algorithm, and we try to observe the impact of
cooperation among users and providers.
3 THE SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
3.1 Cloud Instance Market
We consider the system model for the cloud instance market where multiple cloud users and
providers respectively buy and sell instances in a group auction manner. To buy/sell instances,
the users/providers submit bids/offers to a central controller which supports the instance allo-
cation and pricing determination. This paper considers a discrete-time (e.g., 15 minutes or half
an hour) system so a concept of time slot is involved. We say time slot t for a period between
time t − 1 and time t. For example, saying that the system collects 3 bids at time slot 5 means
that 3 bids are submitted during a period between time instants 4 and 5.
The system deals with K different types of instances. The instance in different types will
require the different size of computing resources such as memory, storage, CPU capacity (e.g.,
EC2 Compute Unit1), and network bandwidth associated with I/O performance (e.g., throughput
and latency). For example, Amazon EC2 [1] offers various types of Standard Instance shown in
Table 2. Different providers provide various types of instances with different combinations of
computing resources.
TABLE 2: Types of Standard Instance Family in Amazon EC2
Instance type Small Medium Large Ex-large
Memory 1.7 GB 3.75 GB 7.5 GB 15 GB
Storage 160 GB 410 GB 850 GB 1690 GB
EC2 Compute Unit 1 2 4 8
I/O performance Moderate Moderate High High
Modern Internet applications are designed using multiple servers at multiple tiers, each of
which provides a certain functionality [26]. For example, a front-end Web server is responsible
for HTTP processing, a middle-tier Java application server implements the application logic,
and a back-end database server stores user information. The different tiers of an application are
assumed to be distributed across different servers. Depending on the desired capacity, a tier may
also be clustered by multiple servers of the same type, which are connected in parallel.
1. One EC2 Compute Unit provides the equivalent CPU capacity of a 1.0-1.2 GHz 2007 Opteron or 2007 Xeon processor.
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The servers are requested/provided by users/providers as instances [27], [28] mentioned above.
A cloud user requests a bundle of instances that represents a multitier application and buys the
instances in a taking-all-or-none manner. For example, a user requests four Small instances (for
Web servers), two Large instances (for application servers), and one Ex-large instance (for a
database). If one of the requested instances cannot be provided, then other requested instances
become useless to the user. We also assume that the bundle of instances will be hosted by one
provider to take advantage (e.g., high throughput and short latency) of the proximity among
servers for an application.
3.2 Participants of the Cloud Instance Market
3.2.1 Cloud Users
A cloud user i submits a bid defined by bi = (~di, ~ℓi, vi) where ~di = (d
1
i , d
2
i , . . . , d
K
i )
T is a demand,
and dki indicates the number of instances of type k.
~ℓi = (ℓi, t
s
i , t
e
i )
T is a demand period where
ℓi indicates a length of time that the user i wants to reserve a bundle of the instances between
starting time tsi and ending time t
e
i . For example,
~ℓi = (3, 2, 8) indicates that user i requests instances
for 3 time slots (that do not have to be consecutive) between time 2 and time 8, each of the time
slots reserves ~di instances. We define t
d
i ≡ t
e
i − ℓi and call it the deadline by which the instances
should be assigned to satisfy the demand. vi is user i’s valuation for the demand as a bidding
price, which indicates the maximum price that is acceptable for the user to buy the requesting
instances.
3.2.2 Cloud Providers
A cloud provider j submits an offer defined by oj = (~sj , ~wj, Qj) where ~sj = (s
1
j , s
2
j , . . . , s
K
j )
T
is a supply and skj indicates the number of instances of type k that provider j can provide
per time slot. ~wj = (t
s
j , t
e
j)
T is a supply period2. wj ≡ t
e
j − t
s
j denotes a length of time that a
provider is able to provide the instances between tsj and t
e
j . Qj is provider j’s valuation
3 for the
supply as an offering price curve, which indicates the minimum of a unit price of the offered
instances that the provider wishes to sell. It is defined by a set of vectors over different number
of instances and instance types as follows: Qj = (~q
1
j , ~q
2
j , . . . , ~q
K
j ) where ~q
k
j = (q
k
j [1], . . . , q
k
j [n
k
j ])
T ,
and qkj [n] indicates the offering price when n instances of type k are sold by provider j, and
qkj [0] = +∞. ~q
k
j holds a condition q
k
j [1] ≥ · · · ≥ q
k
j [n
k
j ]. Let Qj[ ~nj ] denote an extraction of the
price curve when ~nj = (n
1
j , n
2
j , . . . , n
K
j ) instances are sold, which is represented as a row vector
Qj [ ~nj ] = (q
1
j [n
1
j ], q
2
j [n
2
j ], . . . , q
K
j [n
K
j ]).
3.3 Overview of the Proposed Group Auction System
The central controller maintains the bids and offers collected from cloud users and providers
respectively, and computes when and how to allocate resources to which users. Figure 1 is a
2. We formalize the supply period as variables whose values are different for different providers. The providers might be
personal providers or small companies that supply their resources for limited time periods [25] while large providers [1] do not
limit the supply period in general.
3. In practice, the provider’s valuation to an instance is determined based on several factors such as the value of applications
to users, the running cost of servers, and other competing providers. It is beyond our work in this paper to understand how
providers set their own valuations. For simplicity, we assume that the valuations are pre-determined.
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Fig. 1: A flowchart of the proposed group auction system.
flowchart of the proposed group auction system and shows how the central controller works.
The system undertakes three main tasks such as the allocation computation (Labels 1© and 2©),
the result reporting (Labels 3© and 4©), and the payment management (Label 5©).
Whenever the central controller receives new bids/offers, it updates their information on
database and computes the best instance allocation (Label 1©) adopting a concept of cooperation
among users and providers (described in the following section). If the controller closes the
bid/offer submission (Label 2©), it reports the recently computed instance allocation to providers
(Label 3©) and announces to users who are the winners/losers of the auction (Label 4©). Once
the charging and payment are complete (Label 5©), users and providers establish the connection
and start to run/host applications (Label 6©).
The instance allocation is formulated as a social welfare (or utility) optimization problem,
and the solution is obtained by the proposed group formation algorithm. The trading prices
are determined based on the social welfare distribution scheme. The details are presented in
Section 4. The formulations of both allocation and pricing are considered to satisfy three auction
properties as follows:
rAn allocation is allocatively efficient if there are no participants who gain utility from decreasing
others’ utility.
r An allocation is individually rational if participants are never charged more than their valua-
tions as a result of the allocation.
r An allocation is budget-balanced if the total profits of providers is the same as the total
payments by users.
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Fig. 2: An example allocation when (a) users cooperate and (b) providers cooperate. The shaded
box indicates the allocated instances. The height of the box represents the number of instances.
3.3.1 Cooperations among Users and among Providers
In the proposed system, users and providers can form coalitions to gain benefits in terms of
resource price and resource utilization efficiency. Figure 2 shows two examples explaining two
types of cooperation. One, illustrated in Figure 2(a), is the case that multiple users request
resources of the same provider to lower the instance price. Another, illustrated in Figure 2(b),
is the case that multiple providers supply resources to meet the same user’s request. An edge-
dotted line indicates the allocation of a user and a provider. A shaded box indicates the allocated
instances. The height of the box represents the number of instances.
For the first type, multiple cloud users are allowed to form a group, i.e., we call a user coalition,
and request instances of the same provider in order to buy the instances at a discounted price.
For example, when two users request 10 instances (d1 = 4 and d2 = 6) as a coalition, a provider’s
offering price changes from q[4] (or q[6]) to q[10] where q[4] = q[6] > q[10]. However, a cooperation
may incur a delay of the instance allocation because different users have different demand
periods. Figure 2(a) explains the delay (denoted by an arrow) of User 1 forming a coalition with
User 2. Instances for User 1 could be allocated from time ts1.
For the second type, multiple cloud providers are also allowed to form a group, i.e., we
call a provider coalition. The providers in the same coalition can share users’ demands to meet
their requests. For doing this, users’ instances can be migrated from one provider to another
as indicated by a down arrow in Figure 2(b). This cooperation enables the effective use of the
residual resources and improves their resource utilization. However, the cooperation may incur
a cost for the instance migration. For example, during migration, the degradation of application
performance (e.g., throughput and response time) can be considered as the cost.
3.3.2 Allocation and Bid Closing Time
Denote Bt as a set of bids and Ot as a set of offers that the controller retains at time t, respectively.
A demand period for demands in Bt is specified by t = min{t
s
i |t
s
i ∈ bi, ∀bi ∈ Bt} and t = max{t
e
i |t
e
i ∈
bi, ∀bi ∈ Bt}. The allocation at time t is defined by a three-dimensional (|Bt|× |Ot|× (t− t)) matrix
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Fig. 3: An example of allocation in a group consisting of 3 users and 1 provider over the demand
period of 8 time slots.
At ≡ [aijs] for i = 1, . . . , |Bt|, j = 1, . . . , |Ot|, s = t+1, . . . , t where a binary variable aijs is 1 if user
i’s demand is allocated to provider j at time slot s, and 0 otherwise. We assume that a user’s
demand is satisfied when all of the numbers of requested instances is allocated. Also, we assume
that user’s instances are allocated to one provider at each time slot. Thus, the system does not
consider the partially allocated instances. We denote the optimal allocation by A∗t ≡ [a
∗
ijs], where
the method to obtain it will be discussed in the next section.
Given the allocation At, the controller computes the best time to announce the allocation
information (denoted by in Figure 1). We call it bid closing time, which is denoted as tb = minAt{t
a
i }
where tai is the earliest time that user i’s demand is allocated according to At. Figure 3 illustrates
an example of allocation for three users and one provider over the demand period of eight time
slots. In this example, the allocation is At = [~a11s,~a21s,~a31s] = [(0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0)
T , (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0)T , (0, 0, 1
the demand period is t = ts3 and t = t
e
2, and the bid closing time is t
b = ta3.
4 THE PROPOSED GROUP AUCTION SYSTEM
The instance allocation is formulated as a social welfare optimization problem. The social welfare
is iteratively improved by the proposed group formation algorithm that allows participants to
make group formation decisions to increase their own payoffs. This section first explains the group
and the group structure defined in this paper (Section 4.1) and presents in details instance
allocation formulation (Section 4.2) and the method to obtain the nearly optimal solution by the
group formation algorithm (Section 4.3).
4.1 Group Structure
A group denoted by G consists of a set of users Gu and a set of providers Gp, i.e., G = Gu ∪Gp.
Note that Gu can be an empty set while Gp is a non-empty set (i.e., including at least one
provider). Instances supplied by the providers are allocated to the users in the same group.
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Fig. 4: (a) An example of group structure formed by 5 users and 4 providers. For the readability,
we respectively label ’u’ and ’p’ for users and providers. (b) Example group structures after
migration (by u3), merging (by p2), or splitting decision (by p2).
Within a group, the users cooperate and get a discount when their instances of the same type
are supplied by the same provider, and the providers are allowed to migrate instances among
cooperating providers.
A group structure denoted by Ωt is represented as a partition Πt with a set of associated links Lt
between users and providers. The partition is a set of groups defined by Πt = (G0, G1, . . . , Gm, . . . , GM)
where Gm = {G
u
m, G
p
m}, the m-th group of users G
u
m and providers G
p
m. G0 indicates a group
of users without provider. The users in this group will not join an auction immediately due
to resource limitation (i.e., they are likely to lose an auction) but wait for the next auction
opportunity because the deadline has not been reached yet. Denote It as a set of all users
with the bids Bt and Jt as a set of all providers with the offers Ot. The partition holds fol-
lowing conditions ∪Mm=0G
u
m = It and G
u
m ∩ G
u
m′ = ∅ for all m 6= m
′, and ∪Mm=1G
p
m = Jt and
Gpm ∩ G
p
m′ = ∅ for all m 6= m
′. Given the partition, a set of associated links between users
and providers is defined by Lt = ∪
M
m=1{(i, j)|∀i ∈ G
u
m, ∃j ∈ G
p
m} ∪ {(i, 0)|∀i ∈ G0}. Figure 4(a)
illustrates an example of the group structure formed by five users and four providers where
G0 = {4}, G1 = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}}, G2 = {{5}, {3}}, and L = {(1, 2), (2, 1), (3, 2), (4, 0), (5, 3)}.
4.2 Instance Allocation
4.2.1 Formulation of Social Welfare Optimization
Users and providers are allowed to trade their instances in their own groups. Given bids and
offers in each group, the instance allocation of the group is formulated as an optimization
problem to maximize the social welfare, i.e., the total utilities of the users and providers.
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The utility of user i in group G with the allocation At is given by
ui(G,At) = vi − ci
= vi −
tei∑
s=tsi+1
∑
j∈Gp
aijs · pijs
=
tei∑
s=tsi+1
∑
j∈Gp
aijs · (vis − pijs) (1)
where ci is a final charge to user i, vis ≡
vi
ℓi
is user i’s valuation to instances ~di at time slot s,
and pijs is a trading price for the instances ~di between user i and provider j at time slot s.
The utility of provider j in group G with the allocation At is given by
uj(G,At) = rj − vj
=
∑
i∈Gu
tei∑
s=tsi+1
aijs · pijs − vj
=
∑
i∈Gu
tei∑
s=tsi+1
aijs · (pijs −
∑
k
dki · q
k
j [D
k
js]) (2)
where rj is a provider j’s revenue and vj is a provider j’s valuation to the total amount of
supplied instances Dkjs =
∑
i∈Gu aijs · d
k
i for k = 1, . . . , K. Therefore, the instance allocation A =
[aijs] in group G is formulated as follows:
max
At
U(G,At) =
∑
i∈Gu
ui(G,At) +
∑
j∈Gp
uj(G,At)
=
∑
i∈Gu
tei∑
s=tsi+1
∑
j∈Gp
aijs · (vis − pijs) +
∑
j∈Gp
∑
i∈Gu
tei∑
s=tsi+1
aijs · (pijs −
∑
k
dki · q
k
j [D
k
js])
=
∑
i∈Gu
tei∑
s=tsi+1
∑
j∈Gp
aijs · (
vi
ℓi
−
∑
k
dki · q
k
j [D
k
js])
=
∑
i∈Gu
xi · vi −
∑
i∈Gu
tei∑
s=tsi+1
∑
j∈Gp
aijs
∑
k
dki · q
k
j [D
k
js] (3)
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subject to
Dkjs =
∑
i∈Gu
dki ≤ s
k
js, (4)
xi · ℓi =
tei∑
s=ts
i
+1
yis, (5)
yis =
∑
j∈Gp
aijs (6)
xi ∈ {0, 1}, yis ∈ {0, 1}, aijs ∈ {0, 1} (7)
for ∀i ∈ Gu, ∀j ∈ Gp, t < s ≤ t, 1 ≤ k ≤ K where t = min{tsi |∀i ∈ G
u}, t = max{tei |∀i ∈ G
u}.
Thus, the social welfare optimization problem is formulated to find the instance allocation
that maximizes the total utilities of users and providers (Equation (3)) under constraints (4)-(6)
of the amount of supplied instances and about the allocation. Constraint (4) guarantees that
the total number of requested/allocated instances does not exceed the total number of supplied
instances. Constraint (5) indicates that a user’s demand is satisfied when all of the requested
instances are allocated, which is specified by a binary variable xi. Constraint (6) indicates that
user’s instances are allocated to only one provider at each time slot, which is specified by a
binary variable yis. Thus, the system does not consider the partially allocated instances.
4.2.2 A Dynamic Algorithm to Find the Nearly Optimal Solution
The formulated binary integer programming is known to be NP-hard that the number of differ-
ent allocations to be evaluated exponentially increases as the numbers of users and providers
increase. We propose a dynamic algorithm to find the nearly optimal solution in a reasonable
time.
Algorithm 1 shows the dynamic algorithm to find the nearly optimal solution given bids Bt
and Ot at time t. The key idea of this algorithm is to give higher allocation priority to users who
bid with higher valuation and providers who offer with lower valuation. Besides, the algorithm
allocates instances from the time slot that more users request their instances to the time slots
that less users request because providers are likely to offer a discount price in such time slot.
At the beginning (Lines 1-9), the algorithm checks the users’ demand periods and counts how
many users request their instances over different time slots from t+ 1 to t. C is a count vector,
whose element Cs indicates the number of users whose demand periods include the time slot s.
Pos is a mapping between users and providers, whose element Posi is a provider id that a user
i is assigned to. Posi = 0 means that a user i is not mapped to any providers.
In the following loop (Lines 12-37), the algorithm finds the allocation At by starting to consider
time slot s in descending order of the counts C (Line 12). The first subloop (Lines 16-30) computes
the best mapping between users and providers at time slot s. According to the total number
of instances requested by users in the same group (Line 21), the users with relatively higher
valuations are preferably assigned (Line 30) to providers with relatively lower valuations if such
providers j∗ exist (Line 23). If there is no such providers, then users consider other providers
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in different groups (Line 26). If users cannot find any providers, then their demands cannot
be assigned at this time slot (Line 25). The second subloop (Lines 32-36) updates the recent
allocation based on the computed mapping. Once all instances requested by a user are mapped,
the user i and his bid bi are excluded (Line 36).
4.2.3 Trading Price Determination
Based on the allocation, the trading price is determined in a way that the social welfare is dis-
tributed to participants in proportional to their contributions, i.e., valuations. First, the controller
computes the total price charged to users for each group G. The price at time slot s is given as
follows:
pGs = κ ·
∑
i∈Gu
vis + (1− κ) ·
∑
j∈Gp
vjs (8)
= κ ·
∑
i∈Gu
vi
ℓi
+ (1− κ) ·
∑
j∈Gp
∑
k
Dkjs · q
k
j [D
k
js] (9)
where κ ∈ [0, 1]. κ is set to 0.5 in this paper to give users and providers the fairness.
Second, the users in G divide the total price pGs in weights proportional to the user’s valuation.
Hence, the price for user i is defined by
pijs =
vis∑
i∈Gu vis
· pGs (10)
=
vis
Vs
· (κ ·
∑
i∈Gu
vis + (1− κ) ·
∑
j∈Gp
vjs) (11)
= aijs · (κ · vis + (1− κ) ·
vis
Vs
· vjs) (12)
where Vs =
∑
i∈Gu vis is the total valuation of users in G.
Consequently, the cost (i.e., the total charge) for user i is
ci =
tei∑
s=tsi+1
∑
j∈Jt
pijs, (13)
and the revenue for provider j is
rj =
∑
i∈It
tei∑
s=tsi+1
pijs. (14)
4.3 A Group Formation Algorithm
In the proposed system, the social welfare is further improved by the group formation al-
gorithm that leverages the concept of cooperation among users and providers (as described
in Section 3.3.1). The proposed group formation algorithm allows participants to make group
formation decisions to increase their own payoffs.
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Algorithm 1: findInstanceAllocation(Bt, Ot)
Input: Bt: a set of bids (from a set of users It)
Ot: a set of offers (from a set of providers Jt)
Output: At = [aijs]: an allocation
1 At ← 0;
2 /* Count the number of users whose demand periods are in timeslots s */
3 t← min{tsi | ∀bi ∈ Bt}
4 t← max{tei | ∀bi ∈ Bt}
5 for timeslot s← t + 1 to t do
6 Cs ← 0
7 foreach user i ∈ It do
8 if tsi < s ≤ t
e
i then Cs ← Cs + 1
9 C ← (Ct+1, Ct+2, . . . , Ct) // A count vector
10 Pos ← (Pos1, . . . ,Pos|It|) // A mapping between users and providers
11 /* Find the allocation from timeslot in descending order of Cs */
12 foreach timeslot s in sort(C,’descend’) do
13 Gg ← ∅ for g = 1, . . . , |Jt|
14 /* Handling users in descending order of valuation vi
ℓi
*/
15 U ← ∅ // A set of allocated users
16 foreach user i ∈ It such that t
s
i < s ≤ t
e
i do
17 g ← min{g | Gg = ∅, g = 1, . . . , |Jt|}
18 P ← ∅ // A set of allocated providers
19 for g ← 1 to g do
20 /* µ = 1 if i /∈ U , and 0 otherwise */
21 ~Ds ← µ · ~di +
∑
m∈Gg
~dm
22 /* Find a provider with the lowest valuation */
23 j∗ ← argminj∈Jt{vj =
∑
kD
k
s · q
k
j [D
k
s ] | vj ≤ vi, ~Ds ≤ ~sjs, j /∈ P}
24 if j∗ == 0 then
25 if g == g then Posi ← 0
26 else P ← P ∪ {Posm | ∃m ∈ Gg}
27 else
28 U ← U ∪ {i}
29 Gg ← Gg ∪ {i}
30 Posm ← j∗ for ∀m ∈ Gg
31 /* Update the allocation information */
32 foreach user i ∈ It do
33 if Posi 6= 0 then
34 ai,Posi,s ← 1; ℓi ← ℓi − 1
35 if ℓi == 0 then
36 It ← It − {i}; Bt ← Bt − {bi}
37 return At = [aijs]
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4.3.1 Payoff
The payoff for user i is designed as the difference between the utility and the delaying penalty
by forming a group and defined as follows:
φui (G) = ui(G,A
∗
t )− ξi(G,A
∗
t ) (15)
where A∗t = argmaxAt U(G,At), and the delaying penalty is defined by
ξi(G,A
∗
t ) =
tei∑
s=tsi+1
a∗ijs · zis · C
d (16)
where zis =
{
s− tsi − ℓi if s > t
s
i + ℓi
0 otherwise.
(17)
The actual cost Cd may differ according to different participants, applications, and time slots.
However, for simplicity, we assume that the actual cost is proportional to the delay.
Similarly, the payoff for provider j is designed as the difference between the utility and the
additional cost by migrating instances and defined as follows:
φpj(G) = uj(G,A
∗
t )− ξj(G,A
∗
t ) (18)
where the cost for instance migration is defined by
ξj(G,A
∗
t ) =
t∑
s=t+1
mjs · C
m (19)
where mjs =
{
1 if a∗ijs = 1 ∧ a
∗
ij′s−1 = 1, j 6= j
′
0 otherwise.
(20)
The migration cost Cm also differs among providers. However, we assume the value to be a
constant for all providers.
4.3.2 The Proposed Group Formation Algorithm
For constructing a group formation, we introduce an algorithm that allows users and providers
to make the group formation decisions for selecting which groups (i.e., providers) to join and
which users to accept. The decisions are called migrating, merging, and splitting.
Migrating: Given a group structure Ω = (Π = (G1, . . . , Gm, . . . , GM), L), any user i ∈ G
u
m
decides to migrate from its current associated provider j ∈ Gpm to another provider j
′ ∈ Gpm′
where m 6= m′ if the following condition is satisfied:
φui (Gm′ ∪ {i}) > φ
u
i (Gm). (21)
The condition (21) guarantees for a user to improve its own payoff by performing the migrating
decision. For every single migration of user i, the group structure Ω is updated to Ω′ = (Π′, L′)
where Π′ = (Π\{Gm, Gm′}) ∪ {Gm\{i}, Gm′ ∪ {i}}, and L
′ = L\(i, j) ∪ (i, j′).
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Merging: Multiple groups Gm ∈ Πs, a subset of Π (i.e., Πs ⊆ Π) can collectively form a single
group G†m′ if the following conditions are satisfied:
∃j ∈ Gpm, φ
u
j (G
†
m′) > φ
u
j (Gm), Gm ∈ Πs (22)
φui (G
†
m′) ≥ φ
u
i (Gm), ∀i ∈ G
u
m, ∀Gm ∈ Πs (23)
φpj′(G
†
m′) ≥ φ
p
j′(Gm), ∀j
′ ∈ Gpm, j
′ 6= j, ∀Gm ∈ Πs (24)
where G†m′ = ∪ΠsGm. The first condition in (22) guarantees for a provider to improve its own
payoff by performing the merging decision. The other conditions guarantee that none of the
other members (both users and providers) in the newly formed group decreases their payoffs
by the merging decision. For every single merging decision, the group structure Ω is updated
to Ω† = (Π†, L) where Π† = (Π\{∀Gm ∈ Πs}) ∪G
†
m′ where |Π
†| < |Π|.
Splitting: Given the original group Gm, members in this group can collectively split into
multiple groups G‡m′ , whose set after the splitting is denoted by Π
‡
s, if the following conditions
are satisfied:
∃j ∈ Gpm, ∃G
‡
m′ ∈ Π
‡
s, φ
p
j(G
‡
m′) > φ
p
j(Gm), Gm ∈ Πs (25)
∃G‡m′ ∈ Π
‡
s, φ
u
i (G
‡
m′) ≥ φ
u
i (Gm), ∀i ∈ G
u
m (26)
∃G‡m′ ∈ Π
‡
s, φ
p
j′(G
‡
m′) ≥ φ
p
j′(Gm), ∀j
′ ∈ Gpm, j
′ 6= j (27)
where Gm = ∪Π‡sG
‡
m′ and for all G
‡
m′ there exist (i, j) ∈ L such that i ∈ G
‡u
m′ and j ∈ G
‡p
m′ . The
first condition in (25) guarantees for a provider to improve its own payoff by performing the
splitting decision. The other conditions guarantee that none of the members in newly formed
groups decreases their payoffs by the splitting decision. For every single splitting decision, the
group structure Ω is updated to Ω‡ = (Π‡, L) where Π‡ = (Π\Gm)∪{∀G
‡
m′ ∈ Π
‡
s} where |Π
‡| > |Π|.
Figure 4(b) illustrates example group structures after migrating, merging, or splitting decision
given the group structure in Figure 4(a). For example, after the migration by u3, the group struc-
ture changes to G0 = {4}, G1 = {{1, 2}, {1, 2, 4}}, G2 = {{3, 5}, {3}}, and L = {(1, 2), (2, 1), (3, 3), (4, 0), (5, 3)}
After the merging by p2, the groups 1 and 2 become one group G1 = {{1, 2, 3, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}
with the same associated links. After the splitting by p2, the group 1 is splitted into G1 =
{{2}, {1, 4}}, G3 = {{1, 3}, {2}} with the same associated links.
Algorithm 2 shows a pseudocode of the proposed group formation algorithm that finds a
stable group structure. At the beginning (Line 3), the algorithm initializes a group structure Ω
by randomly setting groups and associated links (Lines 4 and 5 in Algorithm 3). A randomly
initialized group structure converges to the stable group structure for participants by repeatedly
selecting distributed decisions (Lines 9, 13, and 16) that improve both users and providers’
payoffs. During the iterations (Lines 4-18), a history set H is maintained, which stores the groups
that are formed or evaluated in the past. To compute the payoffs, Algorithm 1 is executed. The
algorithm stops when none of the participants changes their groups (Line 18).
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Algorithm 2: findGroupStructure(Bt , Ot, Ωt)
Input: Bt: a set of bids (from a set of users It)
Ot: a set of offers (from a set of providers Jt)
Ωt: the current group structure at time t
Output: ΩFt : the final group structure
1 H ← ∅ // A history set of previously seen groups
2 /* Randomly initialize a group structure at the beginning */
3 if Ωt == ∅ then Ω← initGroupStructure(It, Jt) // Algorithm 3
4 repeat
5 /* Given the current group structure Ω */
6 foreach user i ∈ It do
7 /* i searches a provider j′ that satisfies (21).
8 If such j′ is found, and Gm′ ∪ i /∈ H , then i performs a migrating operation. */
9 Ωt ←Migrating(i,Ω)
10 foreach provider j ∈ Jt do
11 /* j searches a possible group Gm′ that satisfies (22)-(23).
12 If such group is found, and Gm′ /∈ H , then j performs a merging operation. */
13 Ωt ←Merging(Ω, j)
14 /* j searches a possible partition of its own group Gm, which satisfy (25)-(26).
15 If such partition is found, and G‡m′ /∈ H , then j performs a splitting operation. */
16 Ωt ← Splitting(Ω, j)
17 H ← H ∪G, ∀G ∈ Π of Ωt
18 until None of users and providers changes their groups.
19 return ΩFt ← Ωt
Algorithm 3: initGroupStructure(It , Jt)
Input: It: a set of users, Jt: a set of offers
Output: Ω0: an initial group structure
1 Guj , G
p
j ← ∅ , for j = 1, . . . , |Jt|
2 foreach user i ∈ It do
3 m← rand(1, |Jt|)
4 Gum ← G
u
m ∪ {i}
5 L← L ∪ (i,m)
6 foreach provider j ∈ Jt do
7 Gj ← G
u
j ∪ (G
p
j = {j})
8 Return Ω0 = {G1, . . . , G|Jt|}
5 ANALYSIS OF THE GROUP FORMATION ALGORITHM
This section gives a theoretical analysis of the proposed group formation algorithm in terms
of the time complexity and stability. Subsequently, we discuss that the proposed group auction
system holds three auction properties described in Section 3.3.
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5.1 Time complexity
The binary integer programming formulated in Section 4.2.2 is known to be NP-hard that
the number of different allocations to be evaluated exponentially increases as the numbers of
users and providers increase. For example, the numbers of users and providers are N and
M , respectively. There exist T (N,M) possible mappings (i.e., instance allocations) between the
users and providers where T (n,m) =
∑n
i=0
(
n
i
)
·T (n− i,m− 1) when T (0, k) ≡ 1 for ∀k ∈ N0 and
T (k+, 0) ≡ 0 for ∀k+ ∈ N+.4 In addition, if we consider the number of time slots S in a demand
period, then the number of possible combinations of the mappings increases to T (N,M)S , which
is factorial O(N !) in O-notation.
The proposed group formation by Algorithm 2 is quadratic to the number of participants. The
algorithm contains a loop (Lines 4-18) that evaluates decisions of participants. For each single
decision, we need to compute the instance allocation by Algorithm 1 whose complexity is linear
O(S·N ·M) to participants and time slots. If the loop is executed for k times, then Algorithm
1 is run for k · (N+M) times. Therefor, the complexity of the proposed group formation is
O(k·(N+M)·S·N ·M) ∼ O(k·S·N2) in O-notation when N ≫ M .
5.2 Stability
The stability of the proposed group formation algorithm is guaranteed by the concept of Nash
equilibrium described in [29]. We relax the stability conditions by considering a relaxing param-
eter ǫ ≥ 0 (epsilon) as follows.
Theorem 1. Given any initial group structure, the proposed group formation algorithm always termi-
nates, i.e., converges to a final group structure.
Proof: Let Ωrnr denote the group structure formed after nr decisions made by one or more
participants during r iterations of Algorithm 2 (Lines 4-18). Starting from any initial group
structure Ω00, the proposed algorithm iteratively transforms the group structure into another
group structure by taking a sequence of migrating, merging, and/or splitting decisions. The
sequence of decisions yields the following transformations of the group structure
Ω00 = Ω
1
0 → Ω
1
1 → · · · → Ω
1
n1
= Ω2n1 → · · · → Ω
r
nr
= Ωr+1nr → · · · → Ω
T
nT
(28)
where the operator → indicates the occurrence of one of three decisions. In other words, Ωrnr →
Ωr+1nr+1 implies that during the (r + 1)th iteration, nr+1 − nr decisions are made by participants,
which results in a new group structure Ωr+1nr+1 starting from a group structure Ω
r
nr
. By inspecting
the conditions for the decision making defined in (21)-(26) and a history set of previously seen
groups, it can be seen that every single decision leads to a new group structure that has not yet
visited. Hence, for any two group structures Ωana and Ω
b
nb
where na 6= nb in the transformations
in (28), it is true that Ωana 6= Ω
b
nb
.
Given this property and the well known fact that the number of possible group structures
formed by a finite set of participants (i.e., I and J) is finite and given by the Bell number
4. N0 indicates a set of non-negative integers, and N+ is a set of positive integers.
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[30], the number of transformations is finite. Therefore, the proposed group formation algorithm
always terminates and converges to one group structure ΩTnT ≡ Ω
F , a final group structure.
Definition 1 (ǫ-Nash equilibrium). A group structure Ω = (Π, L) is ǫ-Nash-stable if for all users i ∈ I ,
φui (Gm) ≥ φ
u
i (Gm′ ∪{i})− ǫ, i ∈ G
u
m, and for all providers j ∈ J , φ
p
j (Gm) ≥ φ
p
j (Gm′ ∪{j})− ǫ, j ∈ G
p
m,
for all other groups Gm′ ∈ Π, Gm 6= Gm′ . Nash equilibrium is a special case of ǫ-Nash equilibrium with
ǫ = 0.
In the ǫ-Nash-stable group structure, no users/providers can gain an extra payoff more than
ǫ by unilaterally moving from its current group to another group.
Proposition 1. Any final group structure ΩF obtained by the proposed group formation algorithm is
ǫ∗-Nash-stable.
Proof: Assume that the group structure ΩF = (ΠF , LF ) obtained by the proposed algorithm
is not Nash-stable (i.e., ǫ = 0). There are two cases to be considered.
Case 1: There exists a user i in Gm and a group Gm′ ∈ Π
F such that φui (Gm′ ∪ {i}) > φ
u
i (Gm).
Therefore, the user can perform a migrating decision to improve its own payoff. Similarly, there
exists a provider j in Gm and a group Gm′ ∈ Π
F such that φpj (Gm′ ∪ {j}) > φ
p
j (Gm). This implies
that the provider can perform merging and splitting decisions to improve its own payoff under
the true conditions in (23) and (24), and (26) and (27). This contradicts with the fact that the
group structure ΩF obtained by the proposed algorithm is the converged group structure, proved
in Theorem 1.
Case 2: Although the provider has an incentive to move from its current group to another
group, no further transformation by performing a merging (or splitting) decision can be made
when the condition in (23) or (24) (or (26) or (27)) is false. If we relax the stability conditions by
considering a relaxing parameter ǫ∗ > 0, then ΩF is ǫ∗-Nash-stable where ǫ∗ ≡ (ǫ∗u, ǫ∗p) is defined
by
ǫ∗u = max
∀i∈I,∀Gm′∈Π
F
{
max
(
0, φui (G
′
m ∪ {i})− φ
u
i (Gm)
)}
, and
ǫ∗p = max
∀j∈J,∀Gm′∈Π
F
{
max
(
0, φpj(G
′
m ∪ {j})− φ
p
j (Gm)
)}
.
As we can easily see, the lower value of ǫ∗ is preferred in terms of the perfection of the Nash
stability.
5.3 Auction Properties
This section discusses about three auction properties (allocative efficiency, individual rational-
ity, and budget balance) presented in Section 3.3 and shows that the proposed group auction
theoretically holds the properties.
Proposition 2. The instance allocation associated with the group structure obtained by the proposed
group formation algorithm is allocatively efficient.
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Proof: Given a group structure and the associated instance allocation, assume that there
exists a provider who can gain extra utility by merging existing groups or splitting its current
group. However, the conditions in (23) and (24), or (26) and (27) for the decisions restrict the
merging or splitting which reduces the others’ utilities. Thus, the provider does not perform
the decision. For users, migrating to the other group does not decrease the other users’ utilities
due to the assumption of the non-increasing price curve. That is, a trading price of instances
does not increase when the number of users increases. Consequently, no providers gain utility
by decreasing the others’ utilities.
Proposition 3. The instance allocation associated with the group structure obtained by the proposed
group formation algorithm is individually rational.
Proof: This proposition is guaranteed by the line 22 in Algorithm 1 and the trading price
computed from the expression in (12). Any user’s valuation vi does not exceed any provider’s
valuation vj derived from its price curve and the allocation. In addition, the trading price for
instances is ranged between the vi and vj due to a parameter κ ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 4. The instance allocation associated with the group structure obtained by the proposed
group formation algorithm is budget-balanced.
Proof: This proposition is guaranteed by our design of trading price described in Section 4.2.3.
From Equations in (13) and (14),
∑
i∈It
ci =
∑
i∈It
tei∑
s=tsi+1
∑
j∈Jt
pijs =
∑
j∈Jt
∑
i∈It
tei∑
s=tsi+1
pijs =
∑
j∈Jt
rj, (29)
which implies that the total payments by users is the same as the total profits of providers.
6 EVALUATION
This section numerically evaluates the convergence (in Section 6.1) and optimality (in Section
6.2) of the proposed group formation algorithm and presents the advantages of the proposed
real-time group auction system by showing comparison results with different schemes through
the simulation (in Section 6.3).
6.1 Convergence
We verify the convergence of the proposed group formation algorithm from two perspectives.
The first is whether the algorithm always converges over iterations given any parameter setting
(e.g., the number of users, their demands, valuation, etc.) The second is how the randomly
given initial group structure (Line 2 in Algorithm 2) impacts the final group structure (Line 18
in Algorithm 2).
Figure 5(a) shows how social welfare, i.e., the total utilities defined by Equation (3), improves
over iterations at given instance allocation in different configurations of bids and offers. In the
figure, x-axis is the iteration index of the group formation algorithm, and y-axis indicates the
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TABLE 3: Parameter setting for bids and offers. This is used in Figures 5(a) and 6
User’s bid Provider’s offer
Demand: # of instances di ∈ [0, 10] Supply: # of instances sj ∈ [10, 30]
Demand Period: Length ℓi ∈ [1, 6] Supply Period: Length wj ∈ [1, 6]
Starting time tsi ∈ [1, 3] Starting time t
s
j ∈ [1, 3]
Ending time tei ∈ [t
s
i+ℓi, t
s
i+ℓi+6] Ending time t
e
j = t
s
j+wj
Valuation vi ∈ [0, V ] Valuation qj [1] ∈ [5, 10]
V =10 · di · ℓi qj [n] ∈ [1, qj[1]-1]
total utilities of users and providers, whose value is normalized to the value at Iteration 20. The
result is obtained with 8 users and 2 providers requesting for/providing for one instance type
under following bids and offers generated based on parameter setting described in Table 3. For
the user’s valuation, we simply set the maximum valuation-per-unit as 10 cents (i.e., $0.10 for
one instance-per-time-slot), and then we multiply the unit price by the number of instances and
length that a user requests. For example, for a user who requests instances of di = 5 for ℓi = 3,
the value of his valuation is uniformly generated between 0 and 10 · 5 · 3 = 150 cents (=$1.50).
For the provider’s valuation, price curves are randomly generated with qj [1] ∈ [5, 10] followed
by qj [1] = · · · = qj [n− 1] > qj[n] = · · · = qj [sj ] where n ∈ [2, sj]. The line plots in the Figure 5(a)
are the results of 10 randomly generated configurations of bids and offers. The initial group
structure is set to Π = (G0 = {1, . . . , 8}, G1 = {∅, {1}}, G2 = {∅, {2}}) and L = {(i, 0)|i = 1, . . . , 8}
for all cases. The values are normalized to the values at Iteration 20.
In Figure 5(a), we observed three trends in the value improvement. For example, the value
increases more at early iterations (Trend 1), the value increases more at later iterations (Trend
2), and the value gradually increases over some iterations (Trend 3). We observe that for all of
10 different configurations, Algorithm 2 converges to some values after several iterations. The
optimality will be discussed in the next subsection.
Figure 5(b) shows how the initial group structure impacts the final group structure. For this
measurement, we generate one configuration as described in Table 4. We run Algorithm 2 ten
times with 10 different randomly generated initial group structures. The solid-line plots indicate
the social welfare improvement over iterations. A dashed line indicates the sum of the values ǫ∗
(i.e., a relaxing parameter) of participants, which corresponds to one case denoted by a circle-
pointed line. It is seen that, during the process of group formation, the sum of ǫ∗ gradually
decreases and eventually reaches to 0. This implies that the obtained group structure is Nash
stable (i.e., ǫ∗-Nash stable with ǫ∗=0) in this case. We verify that the algorithm finds one group
structure whose social welfare is 118 regardless of initial group structures.
6.1.1 An Example Allocation after Convergence
Figure 5(c) shows the group structure and instance allocation obtained at Iteration 20 with one
initial group structure Π = (G0 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, G1 = {∅, {1}}, G2 = {∅, {2}}) and L =
{(i, 0)|i = 1, . . . , 8}, denoted by a circle-pointed line in Figure 5(b). The final group structure
becomes Π = (G0 = {4}, G1 = {{1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8}, {1, 2}}), and L = {(1, 2), (2, 2), (3, 1), (4, 0),
(5, 1), (6, 1), (7, 2), (8, 1)}. There are some important observations in this result as follows:
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SERVICES COMPUTING, VOL. XX, NO. XX 22
TABLE 4: An example bids/offers configuration for 8 users and 2 providers, generated under
parameter setting in Table I. This is used in Figures 5(b) and 5(c).
Bids Offers
Demand u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 u6 u7 u8 Supply p1 p2
# of instances 2 2 2 5 5 5 10 10 # of instances 20 20
Period: Length 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 6 Period: Length 8 8
Starting time 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 Starting time 1 1
Ending time 6 6 6 8 8 8 8 8 Ending time 8 8
Valuation 8 10 20 10 20 30 40 60 Valuation q1[1]=.50 q2[1]=.60
(per-unit valuation) (1) (1) (1.7) (0.5) (0.8) (1) (1) (1) q1[15]=.40 q2[15]=.30
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Fig. 5: Impact of bids/offers configurations and initial group structures on the social welfare
improvement by the proposed group formation algorithm.
• In time slot 1, Users 3 and 8 are assigned to Provider 1 because Provider 1 offers lower
price ($.50) than Provider 2 ($.60). Users 1 and 2 are not assigned in time slot 1 because
they can get more discount by being allocated after time slot 2 with other users. Users 1
and 2 cannot obtain the discount in time slot 1 with Users 3 and 8 because the total number
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of demands is 14, which does not affect price curves of providers.
• User 4 cannot be allocated by any providers. There are no sufficient supplies (e.g., 17
instances for Provider 1 and 19 instances for Provider 2) between time slots 2 and 5. That
is, User 4 loses the auction due to relatively lower valuation ($0.5 per-unit) than the others.
• In time slots between 2 and 5, Provider 2 accepts Users 1, 2, 6, and 7 whose valuations are
relatively higher than other users. The valuation of Provider 2 becomes lower than that of
Provider 1 when the number of total supplies exceeds 15, which results in the increase of
social welfare. User 3 with the highest valuation among all users remains to be assigned to
Provider 1 because of the migration cost.
• User 8 is assigned in time slots between 1 and 6 (but not between 2 and 7). Given higher
valuation of User 3 ($1.5 per-unit) than that of User 6, the sum of utilities of Users 3 and 8
at time slot 1 is larger than that of Users 6 and 8 at time slot 7.
• Instances for User 6 are migrated from Provider 2 to 1 in time slot 7 due to the lower
valuation of Provider 1.
6.2 Optimality
We also verify that the proposed instance allocation, i.e., the outcome of Algorithm 1, is nearly
optimal compared with an enumeration method, in which all possible allocation combinations
are evaluated. In addition, we compare the allocation in a different scheme called IA-FCFS, which
stands for an Individual Auction by the First-Come-First-Serve allocation. In this scheme, users
individually join an auction in a first-come-first-serve manner, and their demands are allocated
to providers in the order of valuation from the lowest among providers with sufficient supplies.
We call GA-BCT (i.e., Group Auction is executed at the Bidding Closing Time) for our proposed
instance allocation given by Algorithm 1.
Figure 6 shows the statistics (e.g., maximum, minimum, and quarter percentiles) of the social
welfare (i.e., the total utilities of participants) over 100 randomly generated configurations of
bids and offers based on the parameter setting described in Table 3. The initial group structure
is randomly generated. The maximum number of iterations is set to 20. The number in the box
indicates the sum of the differences of the values from the ones obtained by the enumeration.
In Figure 6(a), the statistics for GA-BCT are better than those for IA-FCFS. The main reason
is that instances are efficiently allocated to users so that they get price discounts, which leads
to the increasing social welfare. It also shows that the maximum value for GA-BCT is the same
as that from the enumeration although the percentile values are lower because the proposed
allocation cannot find the optimal solution in some configurations. We also investigate the impact
of the numbers of users and providers on the results in the Figures 6(b)-(d). As the number of
participants increases, the difference of values in GA-BCT and Brute-force increases. GA-BCT
might not find the optimal value; however, the statistics for GA-BCT are still nearly the same
as the optimal and definitely higher than those for IA-FCFS.
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Fig. 6: The statistics of the social welfare over 100 randomly generated configurations. Y-axis
indicates the social welfare given allocation, and the number in the box is the sum of the
difference of the value from the one obtained by Brute-force.
6.3 Simulation Results
This section presents a real-time simulation of the proposed group auction system and discusses
its advantages in terms of the number of auction winners, resource utilization, and total profit
of providers by showing comparison results with different schemes.
6.3.1 Parameter setting for the simulation
The simulation code is written in Matlab and run on a local machine (Intel Xeon 3.6GHz,
4G memory). The input data is generated based on parameter settings described in Table 5.
The obtained results vary based on the generated input data. Because we do not have certain
statistics (e.g., volume, period, requirement, etc) about user requests to the real cloud markets
(e.g., SpotCloud, AmazonEC2, etc), we generate the input data with a uniform distribution.
We run the simulation for SimT=72 time slots period (e.g., 72 hours). During the period, we
fix 2 providers each of whom supplies 50 instances for each of 3 different types (i.e., K=3). We
assume that nbτ , the number of new arrival users within time slot τ , is randomly selected between
0 and 3. Each user’s bid is randomly generated. Similar to the parameter setting described in
the previous section, we set the maximum valuation-per-unit for instance type k as 10k cents
and multiply the unit price by the number of instances and length that a user requests. For
example, for a user who requests instances of ~di = (8, 5, 3) for ℓi = 3, the value of his valuation
is uniformly generated between 0 and 3 · (10 · 8 + 20 · 5 + 30 · 3) = 810 cents (=$8.10). For the
provider’s valuation, price curves are randomly generated with qkj [1] ∈ [5k, 10k] followed by
qkj [1] = · · · = q
k
j [n − 1] > q
k
j [n] = · · · = q
k
j [s
k
j ] where n ∈ [2, s
k
j ]. For the provider’s valuation, we
set price curves as shown in Figure 7. For example, Provider 1’s price curve for type k = 1 is
q11[1] = $0.05 and q
1
1 [31] = $0.03 while Provider 2’s price curve is q
1
2 [1] = $0.06 and q
1
2[16] = $0.04.
6.3.2 Comparison
In this section, we compare the proposed group auction scheme, called GA-BCT-GF (i.e., Group
Auction is executed at the Bidding Closing Time in each of groups determined by Group
Formation algorithm), with different schemes, i.e., IA-FCFS and GA-BCT. Differences among the
schemes are summarized in Table 6. The main differences are usages of Algorithms 1 and 2. In
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TABLE 5: Parameter Setting for the Simulation
Simulation time period SimT = 72 # of instance types K = 3
# of arrival users within time slot τ nbτ ∈ [0, 3] # of providers n
o = 2
User’s bid bi Provider’s offer oj
Demand: # of instances of type k dki ∈ [0, 10] Supply: # of instances of type k s
k
j = 20
Demand Period: Length ℓi ∈ [1, 6] Supply Period: Length wj = SimT
Starting time tsi ∈ [τ+1, τ+3] Starting time t
s
j = 1
Ending time tei ∈ [t
s
i+ℓi, t
s
i+ℓi+6] Ending time t
e
j = SimT
Valuation vi ∼Uniform(0, V ) Valuation Qj = [~qj
k]
V =ℓi
∑
k∈K 10k · d
k
i (Fig. 7)
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Fig. 7: Example price curves for Provider 1 and 2 for instance type of k=1, 2, and 3.
IA-FCFS, both algorithms are not used; instead, users individually join an auction in a first-come-
first-serve manner, and their demands are allocated to providers in the order of valuation from
the lowest among providers with sufficient supplies. In GA-BCT, whenever new participants
arrive to the system, the instance allocation is computed by Algorithm 1 for all participants and
executed at the bidding closing time. In GA-BCT-GF, Algorithm 2 is used to construct a group
formation. The instance allocation is computed by Algorithm 1 and executed at the bidding
closing time for each of the groups.
Figure 8 shows the number of auction winners and losers during the simulation period in
different schemes. Table 7 summarizes the comparison results in terms of the total number
of winners, resource utilization, profit of providers, and average payment of users. From the
number of winners, the request acceptance rate of users, which is the number of winners divided
by the total number of users, will be obtained. The resource utilization is given by the total
allocated (i.e., provided) instances divided by the total supplies of providers. The last column
in the table indicates the improvement of the results by GA-BCT-GF compared to IA-FCFS.
The impact of the group bidding becomes stronger with a dynamic bid closing time. In GA-
BCT-GF, a central controller retains more bids before submitting a group bid. That is, the total
number of requested instances becomes larger than that of IA-FCFS. This results in providers to
lower their offering prices, so more users have a chance to win the auction. For example, during
a time period between t=7 and 12 (indicated by a dotted box), 10 users in total join auctions.
Among the 10 users, 9 users win the auction in GA-BCT-GF while only 4 users win in IA-FCFS.
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TABLE 6: Description of different schemes
Dynamic Group
Description Allocation Formation Cooperation
(Algorithm 1) (Algorithm 2)
IA-
FCFS
Users individually join an auction in a first-
come-first-serve manner, and their demands are
allocated to providers in the order of valuation
from the lowest among providers with sufficient
supplies.
No No
No partici-
pants coop-
erate.
GA-
BCT
All users and providers join a group auction
where the instance allocation is computed by
Algorithm 1 and executed at the bidding closing
time.
Yes No
All partici-
pants coop-
erate.
GA-
BCT-GF
All users and providers are divided into multiple
groups by Algorithm 2. The members in each
of the groups join a group auction where the
instance allocation is computed by Algorithm 1
and executed at the bidding closing time.
Yes Yes
Participants
cooperate
in their own
groups.
Similar results can be observed during a time period between t=31 and 39 (6 users win in GA-
BCT-GF while 3 users win in IA-FCFS). As shown in Table 7, the total number of winners of
GA-BCT-GF (60 (81.1%)) is larger than that of IA-FCFS (53 (71.6%)). GA-BCT-GF achieves 13%
of the improvement in the request acceptance rate.
The proposed group formation also impacts on the total number of winners. It can be observed
that users in GA-BCT-GF have more chance to win an auction before their deadline than those
in GA-BCT. Since the GA-BCT considers one group of all cooperating participants, once the
allocation is determined, it is executed at the bidding closing time of the group. For example,
at time t=9, 2 users lose the auction in GA-BCT (indicated by an arrow) while, in GA-BCT-GF,
the group including the users did not execute the allocation immediately because the bidding
closing time has not met yet, but at t=12. Similar results can be observed at time t=17, 23, 30,
and 40. The total number of winners of GA-BCT-GF (60) is slightly larger than that of GA-BCT
(58) as shown in Table 7.
In terms of the total profit, considering a group auction, Provider 2’s profit increases from
$145.8 (IA-FCFS) to $208.4 (GA-BCT) and $212.1 (GA-BCT-GF) while Provider 1’s profit decreases
from $236.3 (IA-FCFS) to $186.2 (GA-BCT) and $191.7 (GA-BCT-GF). The reason is that when the
number of requested instances is large (e.g., between 15 and 30 in Figure 7), Provider 2 offers
cheaper prices than that of Provider 1. Consequently, the total number of provided instances by
Provider 1 decreases, and hence, the profit slightly decreases. However, if more users participates
the auction, then Provider 1’s profit increases again due to Provider 2’s supply limitation.
During the simulation, 8640 instances (= 2 providers×(20 instances×3 types)×72 SimTime) are
supplied by providers, and 6090 instances ( ~D = (2224, 1831, 2035)) for IA-FCFS, 6405 instances
( ~D = 2655, 2102, 2398)) for GA-BCT, and 7668 instances ( ~D = 2942, 2195, 2531)) for GA-BCT-GF
are allocated, respectively. Due to the optimal instance allocation computation in GA-BCT and
GA-BCT-GF, the resource utilization improves from 70.5% (=6090/8640) to 82.8% (=7155/8640)
and 88.7% (=7668/8640), which shows 26% of the improvement. It follows that the total profits
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Fig. 8: The number of auction winners and losers.
TABLE 7: Summary of simulation results.
Scheme
Improvement
IA-FCFS GA-BCT GA-BCT-GF
#Winners (#Losers) 53(21) 58(16) 60(14) 13% ↑
Total # of allocated 6090 = (2224, 7155 = (2655, 7688 = (2942,
-
instances (D1, D2, D3) 1831, 2035) 2102, 2398) 2195, 2531)
Resource utilization 70.5% 82.8% 88.7% 26% ↑
Total
profit
Provider 1 $236.3 $186.2 $191.7
Provider 2 $145.8 $208.4 $212.1
[Sum] [$382.1] [$394.6] [$403.8] 6% ↑
Avg. payment per user $7.21 $6.84 $6.73 7% ↓
of all providers increases from $382.1 for IA-FCFS to $403.8 for GA-BCT-GF (i.e., 6% of the
improvement), which also gives the 7% of decrements in the average payment (i.e., the average
cost) for users from $7.21 for IA-FCFS to $6.84 for GA-BCT-GF.
Finally, we evaluate the system in the average case analysis.5 Table 8 shows the statistics
(e.g., average and standard deviation) of the results over 100 simulation runs based on the
5. In our simulation, different input data were generated in different simulation runs. So, it is hard to show the confidence
interval of the results. If we run the simulation with the same set of bids and offers, then our system results in the almost same
instance allocation. It means that the confidence interval is approximately 100% but there is no meaning to us. This is one of
the reasons to show the average case analysis rather than the confidence interval.
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same parameter setting (Table 3). The standard deviation is slightly high because the total
number of users arrived during the simulation time period (SimT = 72) is different in different
simulation runs. However, GA-BCT-GF still outperforms the other schemes in this average case
analysis. GA-BCT and GA-BCT-GF accept more users (i.e., more winners) than IA-FCFS, which
leads to increase the profit of providers. Provider 2 gains more profit than that of Provider 1
when considering the group discount. GA-BCT-GF produces more efficient instance allocation
by considering a group formation than that of GA-BCT, which leads to improve the resource
efficiency in terms of its utilization.
TABLE 8: Statistics (Avg ± Stddev) of the results over 100 simulation runs.
Scheme
IA-FCFS GA-BCT GA-BCT-GF
Avg of #Winners 53.57 ± 4.24 59.85 ± 7.78 62.88 ± 4.95
Avg of Resource utilization 69.26% ± 2.83% 81.01% ± 2.83% 85.24% ± 4.24%
Avg of
Total
profit
Provider 1 $242.4 ± $32.1 $201.8 ± $28.8 $202.5 ± $22.1
Provider 2 $175.1 ± $42.3 $223.4 ± $47.6 $238.7 ± $52.1
[Sum] [$394.1 ± $20.2] [$429.3 ± $71.3] [$442.4 ± $67.5]
In summary, the proposed real-time group auction system with cooperation outperforms two
different schemes, mimicking existing cloud hosting services, in terms of the resource efficiency
(e.g., 13% higher request acceptance rate for users, obtained from the number of winners, and
26% higher resource utilization for providers) and monetary benefits (e.g., 7% lower average
payments for users and 6% higher total profits for providers) with the considered simulation
setting. We have shown these advantages in the average case analysis.
7 CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed a real-time group auction system in the cloud instance market, and
the simulation studies have verified its applicability and effectiveness in terms of resource
efficiency and monetary benefits to auction participants. We have shown that the proposed
system outperforms two different schemes, mimicking existing cloud hosting services, in terms of
resource efficiency and monetary benefits. The proposed group formation and instance allocation
algorithms have been analyzed in their complexity, stability, and optimality. The obtained results
have shown that the algorithms with quadratic time complexity find nearly optimal group
structures regardless of configurations and initial conditions.
As our future work, we have left a few issues that have not solved yet and interesting
research directions as follows. First, when to execute the proposed algorithms and when to close
the auction are important problems in real-time auction because the computation of instance
allocation and group formation have time overhead. In the current system, the bid closing time
may not be the best. Finding the best bid closing time is challenging. Second, we will improve the
scalability of our algorithms to accommodate more participants in a reasonable time. In this paper,
we have mainly focused on the design of the system model and algorithms, and we have shown
the theoretical justification instead of evaluating a large number of participants. Third, we will
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investigate various bidding strategies of participants and also different price determination schemes to
know how they affect the monetary benefits to the participants. Those are pre-determined in the
current system. Finally, we will also consider our approach in various and complex situations.
For example, when a user requests multiple applications that have dependency, it might be
interesting to investigate the best resource provisioning, i.e., where (or which machines) to locate
which application, in terms of the performance such as response time and throughput. It might
be also interesting to consider the case that two users request the same application operated by
the same provider, and the two users share the resources for the application.
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